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Learning Intentionally and the
Metacognitive Task
Patti Alleva and Jennifer A. Gundlach

The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive all
other things, takes no notice of itself: and it requires art and pains to set it at a
distance, and make it its own object. But whatever be the difficulties, that lie
in the way of this inquiry; . . . sure I am, that all the light we can let in upon our
own minds; all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings,
. . . bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search of other
things.
—John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding1

Patti Alleva is the Rodney & Betty Webb Professor of Law and Faculty Mentor for Teaching &
Learning Enhancement at the University of North Dakota School of Law. Jennifer A. Gundlach
is the Senior Associate Dean for Experiential Education and Clinical Professor of Law at the
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University.
This symposium grew out of a program of the same name, hosted by the Teaching Methods Section
(and co-sponsored by the Civil Procedure Section) at the Association of American Law Schools’
(AALS) annual conference in New York City on Jan. 8, 2016. Professors Brooke D. Coleman,
David B. Oppenheimer, Christine P. Bartholomew, Angela Upchurch, Cynthia M. Ho, Susan
M. Gilles, and Elizabeth G. Thornburg presented. The program podcast can be found at http://
memberaccess.aals.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?WebCode=LoginRequired&expires=yes&Site=
AALS. Professor Kris Franklin, Section Chair, invited us to put together that program. Professor
Margaret Y.K. Woo, Co-Editor of the Journal of Legal Education, then invited us to put together
this symposium based on that program. We are extremely grateful to both for giving us these
opportunities to explore this important subject and to work with an inspiring group of colleagues
who truly care about the learning side of teaching. We also thank Dean Eric Lane and Professors
Christine Bartholomew, Richard Neumann, Jessica Santangelo and Kristin Weingartner for
thoughtful comments on earlier article drafts, as well as law students Tyler Margolis and Alexa
Zelmanowicz for their helpful perspectives. Our appreciation also goes to Janet Metcalfe,
Professor of Psychology and of Neurobiology and Behavior at Columbia University, for sharing
insights on metacognition and an earlier draft, and to Anne Mostad-Jensen, Head of Faculty
Services at the University of North Dakota School of Law, for her unfailing research support.
And we owe eternal gratitude to all of our students, past and present, who have inspired us to
continually learn.

1.

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book I, Ch. 1, § I, 55 (Roger
Woolhouse, ed., Penguin Books 1997) (1690).
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Introduction
Teaching is not learning. This deceptively simple proposition unites in
purpose the authors and articles in this symposium—The Pedagogy of Procedure:
Using Civil Procedure to Showcase Innovative Teaching Methods. None of our contributors
takes for granted a causal connection between teaching and learning. The
strategies developed by our civil procedure authors recognize the learning
process as an active partnership, where both teacher and student share
responsibilities for maximizing student learning.2 This collaboration may well
mean more, and not less, work for both professor and student. However, that
extra work is worth it if it engages students in ways that motivate them to selfactivate their own strategies for independent and higher-level learning so that
they, in turn, become their own teachers.3
To that end, the articles in this symposium are designed to provide guidance
for addressing the challenges of teaching and learning civil procedure.4 Our
authors who specialize in this area offer a variety of intentional teaching
strategies, with an eye toward being more conscious about what is being
taught, how it is being taught, and why.5 They put learning theory principles
2.

See J.D. Vermunt, Metacognitive, Cognitive, and Affective Aspects of Learning Styles and Strategies: A
Phenomenographic Analysis, 31 Higher Educ. 25, 25 (1996) (noting that “[i]nstruction does not
lead to learning automatically,” that “[t]he learning activities that students employ determine
to a large extent the quality of the learning outcomes they achieve,” and that “teaching
should be directed at encouraging students to use high-quality learning activities.”); Hope
J. Hartman, Teaching Metacognitively, in Metacognition in Learning and Instruction:
Theory, Research and Practice 153 (Hope J. Hartman, ed., 2001) (noting that teachers
who concentrate too much on presenting content and too little on students’ understanding
of it “suffer from the fallacious assumption that ‘teaching = learning’”).

3.

In this sense, teaching is learning. See Vermunt, supra note 2, at 27 (positing that “learning and
instructional activities can be seen as images of each other and that they may be described in
similar terms.”).

4.

For an earlier collection of articles on pedagogy and civil procedure, see Symposium, Teaching
Issues: Civil Procedure, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 1 (2003). For historical treatments of the course, see,
e.g., Bruce A. Kimball & Pedro Reyes, The “First Modern Civil Procedure Course” as Taught by C.C.
Langdell, 1870-78, 47 Am. J. Legal Hist. 257 (2005); Paul D. Carrington, Teaching Civil Procedure:
A Retrospective View, 49 J. Legal Educ. 311 (1999); Mary Brigid McManamon, The History of the
Civil Procedure Course: A Study in Evolving Pedagogy, 30 Ariz. St. L.J. 397 (1998). See also David
L. Noll, A Reader’s Guide to Pre-Modern Procedure, 65 J. Legal Educ. 414 (2015) (explaining the
concepts and devices of pre-modern procedure).

5.

For key insights on intentional teaching, see generally, e.g., Michael Hunter Schwartz,
Sophie Sparrow & Gerald Hess, Teaching Law by Design: Engaging Students from
the Syllabus to the Final Exam xiii (2009) (exploring intentional teaching and learning
techniques for “all aspects of teaching law students,” especially in doctrinal classes). See also
Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory and Instructional Design Can
Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 San Diego L. Rev. 347, 383 (2001) (defining instructional
design as “a reflective, systematic, and comprehensive approach to creating instruction” that
requires analyzing “the learning context, the learners, and the learning task” in developing
instructional strategies that are evaluated and modified, if necessary, in accordance with
what the designer learns from the evaluation); Beryl Blaustone, Improving Clinical Judgment in
Lawyering with Multidisciplinary Knowledge About Brain Function and Human Behavior: What Should Law
Students Learn About Human Behavior for Effective Lawyering?, 40 U. Balt. L. Rev. 607, 615, 637-46
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into practice to help students deepen their learning of the subject and to
develop their own intentional learning strategies.6 These principles underscore
the importance of shifting the locus of learning from teacher to student by
creating context for learning and offering opportunities for active and applied
learning.
This symposium also serves those who teach courses other than civil
procedure. The pedagogic approaches presented here, though placed in a
subject-specific setting, could be modified for use in other classes. In fact, we
undertook to coordinate this symposium and the AALS Teaching Methods
Section Program (of the same name) to spotlight creative and effective
methods for teaching a variety of challenging legal concepts. In this way, civil
procedure is merely an exemplar. It serves as a platform for exploring the
benefits of being intentional about choosing teaching strategies designed to
facilitate deep learning, whatever the subject.
Talking intentionally about teaching and learning within a specialty, as
our civil procedure authors have done, can also provide a springboard for
broader dialogue among law faculty. Our one author who does not teach
civil procedure encourages consideration of subject-specific pedagogy, and
how that approach might improve teaching of that subject as well as inspire
collective conversation about design of the curriculum as a whole.7 Those
most familiar with teaching a course can best identify its specific learning
outcomes and how best to attain them.8 Drawing upon these insights can
(2011) (proposing a reflective “Intentionality framework . . . to assist students in applying
a metacognitive approach to their own learning” and in developing the self-awareness
necessary for law practice). Notably, the AALS 2006 Conference on New Ideas for Law
School Teachers in Vancouver, British Columbia, was titled “Teaching Intentionally.”
6.

Educational practices promoting intentional learning “help students become self-conscious
about and self-directed in their own learning . . . .” William M. Sullivan et al., Educating
Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law 179 (2007) [hereinafter Carnegie
Report] (citation omitted). “Teaching for intentional learning aims explicitly at enabling
students to become aware of what they are doing as they learn the law.” Id. For key insights
on intentional, self-regulated learning, see generally, e.g., Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching
Law Students to be Self-Regulated Learners, 2003 Mich. St. DCL L. Rev. 447, 452-54 (2003)
(defining self-regulated learners as those who assume responsibility for their own learning,
in a repeated but adaptive cycle involving planning, performance, and reflection, in order to
create their own meaning from the materials); Elizabeth M. Bloom, Teaching Law Students to
Teach Themselves: Using Lessons from Educational Psychology to Shape Self-Regulated Learners, 59 Wayne
L. Rev. 311, 315 (2013) (exploring teaching and academic counseling strategies to enable a
diverse population of law students to become self-regulated learners); Roy Stuckey, Teaching
with Purpose: Defining and Achieving Desired Outcomes in Clinical Law Courses, 13 Clinical L. Rev. 807,
822-23 (2007) (advocating that teaching for intentional learning in experiential courses, if
done properly, is “the best tool for helping students develop self-directed learning skills”).

7.

In her symposium article, Professor Kris Franklin encourages faculty within subjects to
explore the unique challenges and aspects of their courses, to determine what teaching
methods are called for to respond to those challenges, and to be more deliberate about
considering the role that their courses play in the curriculum. See generally Kris Franklin, Do
We Need Subject Matter-Specific Pedagogies?, 65 J. Legal Educ. 839 (2016).

8.

See Lori E. Shaw & Victoria L. VanZandt, Student Learning Outcomes

and
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be especially helpful for discerning the proper purpose and placement of a
subject within a progressive curricular structure9 and for transitioning students
from scaffolded10 to independent learning as they move through law school.
This intentional curricular dialogue can also play an important role in a law
school’s ongoing evaluation of the curriculum.11
This symposium also seeks to benefit our students. In particular, if firstyear students read any of these articles (and we hope faculty members will
encourage them to do so), they might gain a better understanding about why
civil procedure is so challenging and how these challenges might be overcome.
Accordingly, we commend not only the intentionality but the transparency of
our authors in laying bare their thinking about how they teach to facilitate
these types of discoveries, as well as to steer “the conversation of colleagues
into the deep places where we might grow in self-knowledge for the sake of our
professional practice . . . .”12 We hope this symposium, and the AALS program
that led to it, will inspire more of us to take calculated and creative teaching
risks in the classroom and curriculum—and to study and share what we learn
about learning as we go.
With these goals in mind, this article begins by suggesting why civil
procedure doctrine is so challenging to teach and learn, noting how the
symposium pieces help to tackle those challenges. Then, we join the growing
number of law professors who advocate that learning how to learn deserves
School Assessment: A Practical Guide to Measuring Institutional Effectiveness 14
(2015) (explaining that “[a]s a professor, setting outcomes is really simply a question of
thinking about where your course fits in the bigger picture.”). See generally Am. Bar Ass’n,
Standard 302: Learning Outcomes, in Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law
Schools 2015-2016, at 15 (2015) [hereinafter ABA Standards], http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2015_2016_chapter_3.
authcheckdam.pdf (requiring every law school to establish learning outcomes for specified
competencies and for “[o]ther professional skills needed for competent and ethical
participation as a member of the legal profession.”).
9.

See Deborah Maranville with Cynthia Batt, Pathways, Integration, and Sequencing the Curriculum,
in Building on Best Practices: Transforming Legal Education in a Changing World
52-58 (Deborah Maranville, Lisa Radtke Bliss, Carolyn Wilkes Kaas & Antoinette Sedillo
López, eds., 2015) [hereinafter Building on Best Practices] (describing various approaches
to creating curricular coherence). Sequencing the curriculum involves “structuring offerings
from introductory to intermediate to advanced, so that later classes build on the concepts
and skills learned in earlier ones.” See id. at 52 (footnote omitted).

10.

See Susan A. Ambrose et al., How Learning Works: Seven Research-Based Principles
for Smart Teaching 215 (2010) (“Scaffolding refers to the process by which instructors
provide students with cognitive supports early in their learning, and then gradually remove
them as students develop greater mastery and sophistication.”).

11.

See Am. Bar Ass’n, Standard 315: Evaluation of Program of Legal Education, Learning Outcomes, and
Assessment Methods, in ABA Standards, supra note 8, at 23 (requiring the dean and faculty
to “conduct ongoing evaluation of the law school’s program of legal education, learning
outcomes, and assessment methods” as the basis for curricular improvements).

12.

Parker J. Palmer, The Heart of a Teacher: Identity and Integrity in Teaching 14
(1997), http://www.couragerenewal.org/PDFs/Parker-Palmer_The-Heart-of-a-Teacher.pdf.
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greater attention in the law school curriculum, given the importance of
learning to law students and lawyers alike. In particular, to round out the
teaching approaches of our authors, we suggest that law schools should do
more to demonstrate respect for the process of learning as an end in itself.13 We
especially extol the use of metacognitive14 strategies to help students develop
greater self-sufficiency and proficiency in confronting learning challenges of
any kind, civil procedure or otherwise. We highlight metacognition because
of its importance to self-regulated learning15 and its benefits for professional
development.16 In doing so, we draw upon the literature in this area, from law
faculty and those in other disciplines, to create what we hope is a helpful miniprimer-plus for use in civil procedure and other doctrinal courses. We close
with suggestions for how law schools can show more institutional respect for
learning as a subject worthy of independent attention.
I. The Challenges of Teaching and Learning Civil Procedure
Civil procedure is difficult to teach and to learn for a number of reasons.17
Most of these challenges also appear in some form in other courses, particularly
those in the traditional first-year curriculum. But civil procedure involves them
all. We briefly explain these challenges below, footnoting how our symposium
authors have responded to them.
13.

Cf. John Dewey, Democracy and Education 54 (Barnes & Noble Books 2005) (1916)
(explaining that “the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end”
involving “continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming.”); Judith Welch Wegner,
Lawyers, Learning, and Professionalism: Meditations on a Theme, 43 Clev. St. L. Rev. 191, 199 (1995)
(arguing that “[i]f legal educators took [a commitment to learning as a professional value]
seriously, law professors would consider the ethical imperative of reexamining how and what
they teach. Law students would come to grips with their personal responsibility to learn
while in law school, and find common ground with their professors in more active learning
partnerships.”).

14.

Metacognition is “the awareness of the process of learning . . . . [It] involves choosing the best way
to approach a learning task, i.e., self-monitoring. . . . [and] includes the ability to know when
and why to apply different strategies to study or solve different problem types. . . . The whole
purpose of teaching metacognitive strategies is to increase students’ self-awareness about
what it takes to learn.” Patricia Liotta Kolencik & Shelia A. Hillwig, Encouraging
Metacognition: Supporting Learners Through Metacognitive Teaching Strategies
6, 7 (2011). See also infra Part II (discussing metacognitive approaches and the importance of
learning about learning to the classroom, curriculum, and legal profession).

15.

See Julie Dangremond Stanton, Xyanthe N. Neider, Isaura J. Gallegos & Nicole C. Clark,
Differences in Metacognitive Regulation in Introductory Biology Students: When Prompts Are Not Enough, 14
CBE—Life Sci. Educ. 1, 2 (2015) (noting that “metacognitive regulation is also a significant
part of self-regulated learning.”) (citation omitted).

16.

See Carnegie Report, supra note 6, at 173 (asserting that “the essential goal of professional
schools must be to form practitioners who are aware of what it takes to become competent in
their chosen domain and to equip them with the reflective capacity and motivation to pursue
genuine expertise. They must become ‘metacognitive’ about their own learning . . . .”).

17.

This article draws heavily from our combined thirty-seven-plus years of experience teaching
some form of civil procedure and related litigation or trial courses.
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(1) Students Lack Direct Experience with the Civil Litigation Process.18 Perhaps
more than any other first-year course, civil procedure implicates not only a
subject, but a legal system in action. With that comes the need for students
to understand the nature of the adversarial system, the roles of each player in
it, including judges, jurors, lawyers, and clients, and the impact of strategic
choice.19 The civil litigation process is also a lot more difficult to grasp without
some foundation in the professional skills and values necessary for making
ethical judgments.20 In addition, it is hard for students to fully appreciate the
competing policy interests that influence the disposition of actions, such as
resource, efficiency, and access-to-justice concerns. The power of the rules of
procedure, which implicate all of these considerations, may not be evident to
students who know little about their practical operation within, and impact
upon, the course of a lawsuit.21 In short, the many moving parts of a living
litigation at legal, factual, and strategic levels can make understanding any
particular stage of it a daunting challenge.22
(2) Students Are Unfamiliar with Procedural Devices.23 Civil procedure is also
among the least intuitive of the first-year courses, as many students do not
18.

To respond to this challenge, Professor David Oppenheimer discusses use of a semester-long
simulated case file of his own design to provide a realistic context for bringing procedural
concepts to life and placing students in an active role as lawyers. The exercises that stem
from the case are designed to balance the desire to provide context and active learning
opportunities with the very real pressures created by time limits and coverage constraints.
See generally David B. Oppenheimer, Using a Simulated Case File to Teach Civil Procedure: The NinetyPercent Solution, 65 J. Legal Educ. 817 (2016).

19.

See George Rutherglen, Teaching Procedure: Past and Prologue, 47 St. Louis U. L. J. 13, 14 (2003)
(arguing that the “strategic behavior of participants in the process should . . . be the focus”
of a civil procedure course).

20.

See Richard A. Matasar, Teaching Ethics in Civil Procedure Courses, 39 J. Legal Educ. 587, 588
(1989) (noting that “[c]ivil procedure courses are ideal for connecting doctrine and ethics”
given that the rules “strain constantly to balance competing interests,” “make moral
assumptions,” “sometimes promote individual over group rights, frequently allow judicial
over party control, and occasionally enhance participatory rights over efficiency.”).

21.

See Jay Tidmarsh, Strategies and Techniques for Teaching Civil Procedure 1 (2013)
(observing that “procedure is best understood by working with it”); Jack H. Friedenthal,
Exploring Some Unexplored Practical Issues, 47 St. Louis U. L. J. 3, 12 (2003) (extolling the periodic
importance of examining “some of the intensely practical matters that illuminate the realities
of litigation” in civil procedure); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power, 52 J. Legal
Educ. 342, 343 (2002) (highlighting the importance of imparting to civil procedure students
the reality that “procedure is power”).

22.

See Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 Brook. L. Rev.
1155, 1174, 1180 (1993) (noting that “much of contemporary civil procedure can be understood
only superficially unless we contextualize and enrich the doctrine” and that “[i]t is not selfevident to a first-year student why and how lawyers take the massiveness of the too many
realities of a dispute and encapsulate them into elements and causes of actions.”).

23.

To respond to this challenge, Professor Oppenheimer’s simulation materials, discussed
supra note 18, include exercises where students are asked to draft the remaining 10% of
partially completed pleadings or motion briefs, allowing them to focus on key aspects of the
subjects studied. These exercises give students exposure to the actual documents litigators
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initially apprehend that the law has a procedural dimension with independent
(and interdependent) legal significance.24 Especially challenging are the
peculiarities of the procedural devices themselves. Most first-year students
have no experience with, or concept of, motions or pleadings. While many
students have watched trials on television, in films, and online, they simply
lack exposure to the technical tools of litigation given that much of the
procedural action is not visible in popular culture recreations. In addition,
students struggle to understand the purpose of each device, where and how it
is used in the litigation process, and the different legal and factual standards
applicable to each. Truly understanding any device requires understanding
them all, which means that the click of comprehension may not come until
after the course concludes.25
(3) The Indeterminate Nature of Procedural Rules.26 Exacerbating these problems
is the common misconception of novice law students that the “rules” of civil
procedure are just that—black-letter strictures capable of objective application
with clear results. In fact, the words of the rules are merely starting points
for understanding what they actually mean. Thus, debunking the myths of
rule certainty becomes a course priority, as this misunderstanding can obscure
the interpretative subtleties and ambiguities of the fact-sensitive, case-specific
rules. It also inhibits students from envisioning more clearly the strategic use
of procedural rules, their interrelationship with other legal authorities, and
use in practice and help to demonstrate how those documents connect with the underlying
doctrine and legal rules the students are learning.
24.

Thus, to some extent, civil procedure professors teach against the curricular grain. The bulk
of the traditional first-year curriculum comprises substantive law courses (e.g., contracts,
torts, property), which also happen to be the subjects most familiar to novice law students.
The unfamiliarity of civil procedure contributes to the sense that it is somehow different
from, and perhaps more difficult than, these other courses, especially given its focus on
process rather than substance. However, as Professor Brooke Coleman observed at the
January 2016 AALS Teaching Methods Section program, civil procedure may indeed be
more intuitive than it appears if the professor taps into students’ inherent appreciation for
fairness in the process of resolving disputes.

25.

Kevin M. Clermont, Integrating Transnational Perspectives into Civil Procedure: What Not to Teach, 56 J.
Legal Educ. 524, 527 (2006) (cautioning that in “a subject so marked by interdependencies
. . . [t]o understand anything, the student must understand everything.”).

26.

To respond to this challenge, Professor Christine Bartholomew tackles the juxtaposition of
the seemingly straightforward language of the pleadings standard in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 (“short and plain statement of the claim”) with the perplexity caused by the
U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of that rule in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (collectively known as “Twiqbal”). Her
approach asks students to apply and interpret Twiqbal’s legal standard as they compare and
evaluate a range of different complaints taken from real cases. These exercises also help to
acquaint students with the practical consequences of drafting decisions as they personally
experience the indeterminacy of the rules and how they intimately affect the strategic
choices that lawyers must make. See generally Christine P. Bartholomew, Twiqbal in Context, 65 J.
Legal Educ. 744 (2016). See also infra Part IIB (discussing how a professor might model the
metacognitive task of “thinking aloud” about rule interpretation to show the indeterminate
nature of procedural rules).
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the key roles of judicial discretion and subjectivity in their interpretation and
application.
(4) Negotiating the Procedure/Substance Divide.27 To make matters more
complicated, mastering the procedural rules requires understanding their
relationship to the substantive law. This pedagogic conundrum is inescapable,
because the procedural rules apply to an array of subject matters or
substantive claims,28 and take their meaning, in good part, from these casespecific applications. The flexibility of the rules, and their interpretation as
applied in a changing claim environment, can create terrible confusion for
students, especially those in the first year, who may too easily focus more on
the substantive law than on the procedural dimensions of the case.29 Moreover,
it can be challenging for students to comprehend how a procedural result
might be affected by the substantive claim, especially since the rules are
meant for uniform application. Couple this with the congressional stricture
that procedural rules should not curtail or change substantive rights30 and
the concomitant principle that procedure, as servant of the substantive law,
exists solely to serve its ends.31 These perspectives may lead students to
falsely conclude that procedural law is less important or has less impact than
substantive law, and to undervalue the unique power of procedure to give life
to substantive rights.32
27.

To respond to this challenge, Professor Bartholomew has designed her complaint exercises
to enable students to explore the interaction between procedural rules and substantive claims
and how judges’ gatekeeping authority comes into play. See Bartholomew, supra note 26, at
765-70. These issues are particularly pertinent to understanding motions made pursuant to
Federal Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, both of which, for their application, rely on understanding
the basic contours of the substantive law claims under scrutiny.

28.

See Subrin, supra note 22, at 1174 (noting that the cases studied in civil procedure “often
first require one to understand the law from entirely different fields, many of which are not
covered during the first year.”); cf. Timothy W. Floyd, Oren R. Griffin & Karen J. Sneddon,
Beyond Chalk and Talk: The Law Classroom of the Future, 38 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 257, 279 (2011)
(opining that “the pervasive presence of civil procedure rules, doctrines, and concepts in
virtually every judicial opinion a law student will ever read raises the stakes regarding the
importance of the traditional civil procedure course.”).

29.

See Subrin, supra note 22, at 1173-74 (pointing out that, for many students, “it is an unpleasant
surprise” that civil procedure is a course that focuses on “rules that govern how lawyers
deal with disputes” rather than rules that “govern the every-day behavior of people and the
relationship of people to property.”).

30.

See The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (stating that the rules of practice and
procedure “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”).

31.

Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 Wash. U. L.Q. 297, 297 (1938) (explaining that
the newly adopted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “involv[ed] the due subordination
of civil procedure to the ends of substantive justice”); see also Edward W. Cleary, Presuming
and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 5 (1959) (noting that “all are
agreed that procedure exists only for the purpose of putting the substantive law effectively
to work.”).

32.

McManamon, supra note 4, at 438 (championing civil procedure as an important course
given the fact that “without a remedy, there is no right.”). See also Tidmarsh, supra note 21,
at 1 (observing “[b]ecause [the course] focuses on how we enforce rights, not what those
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(5) Overlapping State and Federal Sovereigns and Judicial Systems.33 Understanding
the procedure/substance divide—as well as the limited subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal trial courts, their extraterritorial reach, and the Erie
doctrine (to name a few course concepts)—necessarily implicates the most
fundamental notions of a constitutional democracy.34 Those notions include
the sources of law in our federalist system, the relationship among federal
and state sovereigns, the separation and balance of powers among the federal
branches of government, and the overlapping yet discrete roles of the federal
and state courts in settling fact-specific disputes. These, in turn, implicate
the constitutionally and congressionally confined role that the federal trial
courts play in resolving those disputes. Without solid grounding in these
fundamentals, students may have trouble fitting the course together into a
coherent whole and seeing the intricate interrelationships among sovereigns
that affect procedural and jurisdictional design.
(6) The Complexity of Legal Interpretation.35 Civil procedure requires students to
master the relationships among constitutional provisions, statutes, rules, cases,
and advisory committee notes—an unsettling prospect for even experienced
lawyers. The U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of key jurisdictional
doctrines has notably shifted over time, requiring students to synthesize a series
of difficult-to-reconcile cases (not infrequently with fractured opinions), all of
which implicate understanding principles of constitutional law, federalism,
and statutory interpretation. Accordingly, novice law students must employ
a complex array of doctrinal knowledge and analytical skills, all at the same
time, often without mastery of any or even an awareness of the different strands
of learning bundled together at each step of the reasoning process.
rights are, Civil Procedure seems odd or out of kilter to most students.”); cf. Elizabeth N.
Schneider, Rethinking the Teaching of Civil Procedure, 37 J. Legal Educ. 41, 42 (1987) (noting that
civil procedure “focuses students’ attention on the value of process as a social and human
value in and of itself.”).
33.

For a response to this challenge, see infra Part IIB (discussing the use of metacognitive
questions for students to assess their understanding of the Erie doctrine).

34.

Professor Richard Freer captures some of these complexities in describing the separation
of powers and federalism aspects of the Rules Enabling Act: “First, it attempts to limit
rulemaking authority to matters of ‘procedure.’ If the judicial rulemaking process were to
stray into matters of substantive law, it would constitute a usurpation of legislative power. To
the extent the federal government wishes to legislate regarding substantive law and policy, it
must do so through Congress. . . . Second, it attempts to ensure that the federal government
does not use the guise of a rule of procedure to encroach on state substantive law.” Richard
D. Freer, Civil Procedure 541 (3d ed. 2012).

35.

To respond to this challenge, Professors Cynthia Ho, Angela Upchurch, and Susan Gilles
target the teaching and learning quandaries of personal jurisdiction, which, as they explain, is
a subject that epitomizes this complexity. They offer a number of teaching methods designed
to provide students with context for learning, including the use of visual aids and analytical
frameworks for approaching the material, as well as active-learning opportunities such as
multiple forms of assessment questions. See generally Cynthia M. Ho, Angela Upchurch &
Susan M. Gilles, An Active-Learning Approach to Teaching Tough Topics: Personal Jurisdiction as an
Example, 65 J. Legal Educ. 772 (2016).

Learning Intentionally and the Metacognitive Task

719

While some of these six challenges are not unique to civil procedure, they
certainly add a layer of opacity to the learning process, especially if the course
is taught in the first semester of the first year. There are simply too many
new things to be learned at once. In our experience, civil procedure students
appreciate and benefit from hearing explicitly from us that these particular
challenges exist, are difficult to surmount, and require dedicated efforts to
master. Making students aware of these challenges can enhance their abilities
to be more intentional in monitoring their learning about them. These are
important preliminary steps in positioning students to take ownership of their
own learning and to become strategic, self-regulated learners who pay attention
to how they are learning. Knowing how to learn effectively should also help
them to become lifelong learners, equipped to tackle the daily demands of
practice, replete, as it is, with an ever-changing landscape of variables requiring
adaptability and versatility. Accordingly, we join those in the legal academy
who advocate that law schools elevate the subject of learning about learning
to a more prominent place in the professional development of law students.
II. Bringing the Subject of “Learning About Learning” to the
Forefront of Curricular Consciousness
Professor Judith Welch Wegner argued more than two decades ago that “a
commitment to learning is an appropriate and necessary professional value for
lawyers.”36 She cautioned:
Lawyers are (or should be) by temperament and training “learners.” Unless
lawyers embrace that notion more consciously, they run the risk of forfeiting
their proud heritage and compromising their capacity to deal with a rapidly
changing future. A more self-conscious commitment to learning can provide a
needed anchor in times when many fear that lawyers’ sense of professionalism
has drifted.37

At the heart of Wegner’s admonition is the reality that lawyers must actively
and continually learn in order to exercise sound professional judgment, to selfunderstand and self-improve, and to assume leadership roles in the profession
and community at large.38 Simply put, the ability to learn is essential for the
problem-solving legal professional.39
36.

Wegner, supra note 13, at 192.

37.

Id.

38.

See generally Stephen Preskill & Stephen D. Brookfield, Learning as a Way of Leading:
Lessons from the Struggle for Social Justice (2009). In debunking traditional notions
of leadership (as individual, hierarchical, dispassionate, and controlling), Preskill and
Brookfield advocate instead for a model of relational and collaborative leading they call
“learning leadership”: “[W]e need leaders who strive to place learning at the center of their
work. Such leaders know in their bones that they have much to learn and that the people
likely to be their best teachers are the co-workers they see and collaborate with everyday.
They also see encouraging the learning of others as the central responsibility of leadership.”
Id. at 3, 6.

39.

See Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Lawyers and Learning: A Metacognitive Approach to Legal Education,
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But not only must learning be continuous throughout a lawyers’ career,
the learning process itself must be sound. Learning, after all, is a process to
be honed.40 It must involve interrogating assumptions, thoughts, conclusions,
and feelings. It further requires the willingness to assess and revisit knowledge
to ensure its integrity. Learning deeply takes discipline, experimentation,
struggle, patience, and perseverance in the face of unsatisfying uncertainty. It
may not be an overstatement to say that losing sight of the deliberateness of
learning in a quick-click world threatens the integrity of legal education and,
in turn, the legal profession.
Research shows that many students leave high school and college
with insufficient understanding of how to learn effectively, despite prior
educational successes.41 Compounding this is the fact that our students live
in a world complicated by the overload and distractions of electronically
available, digitized information—a reality that can adversely affect some of the
constituent skills of learning, such as reading and concentration.42 The upshot
13 Widener L. Rev. 33, 41 (2006) [hereinafter Niedwiecki, Lawyers and Learning] (arguing
“lawyers never stop learning. . . . Law schools, however, fail to teach lawyers how to learn.”)
(emphasis added); Roy Stuckey et al., Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision
and a Road Map 11 (2007) (noting that “[l]awyers learn throughout their careers from
experience, collaboration, self-study, reflection, and continuing legal education.”).
40.

Ambrose et al., supra note 10, at 3 (explaining that “[l]earning is a process, not a product.
. . . [It] involves change in knowledge, beliefs, behaviors, or attitudes. . . . [And it] is
not something done to students, but rather something students themselves do. It is the
direct result of how students interpret and respond to their experiences—conscious and
unconscious, past and present.”) (emphases omitted).

41.

See, e.g., Saundra Yancy McGuire with Stephanie McGuire, Teach Students How
to Learn: Strategies You Can Incorporate into Any Course to Improve Student
Metacognition, Study Skills, and Motivation 10-12 (2015) (explaining why so many
college students do not know how to learn even though they did well in high school); Ruth
Vance & Susan Stuart, Of Moby Dick and Tartar Sauce: The Academically Unprepared Law Student and the
Curse of Overconfidence, 53 Duq. L. Rev. 133 (2015) (positing various factors contributing to the
unpreparedness of new law students, including misplaced confidence about underdeveloped
study habits that seemed to work well in other, less challenging academic settings); Richard
Arum & Josipa Roksa, Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on College Campuses 31,
121 (2011) (reporting that “large numbers of U.S. college students . . . are failing to develop
the higher-order cognitive skills that it is widely assumed college students should master” in
part because “many contemporary college academic programs are not particularly rigorous
or demanding”).

42.

See generally Shailini Jandial George, Teaching the Smartphone Generation: How Cognitive Science
Can Improve Learning in Law School, 66 Me. L. Rev. 163 (2013) (surveying studies describing
how millennial law students’ use of technology affects their attention and learning and
proposing ways for law schools to teach students how to learn in law school). One 2005
study analyzed changes in reading behavior in a digital, screen-based environment over the
prior ten years. It found that while overall time spent on reading increased, the nature of the
reading behavior was quite different, characterized by more browsing, scanning, keyword
spotting, one-time reading, selective reading, and nonlinear reading. The study also found
that screen-based readers spent less time on in-depth and concentrated reading and showed
declining sustained attention. See Ziming Liu, Reading Behavior in the Digital Environment: Changes
in Reading Behavior over the Past Ten Years, 61 J. Documentation 700 (2005). Given the reading
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is that any number of students may be entering law school without an in-depth
understanding of how to learn. This suggests that law schools must undertake a
systematic response to this problem by targeting improvement of the learning
process itself.43
Some law faculty may rightfully question whether law schools should bear
the responsibility to teach “learning about learning.” After all, within each
course there is already precious little time to teach the basics. In addition, to
our knowledge, most law professors are not learning-theory experts, and few
have professional education in this area. Nor are most faculty traditionally
rewarded for taking the time to become more familiar with the teaching and
learning literature and to incorporate what they learn about learning into their
courses.
These are appropriate cautions. But given the centrality of learning to
lawyering, it is increasingly difficult to indulge a presumption that all of our
students enter law school with sufficient knowledge of how they need to learn
in order to become self-regulated learners in the ways required of the wellrounded legal professional.44 Placing a premium on the process of learning—
and what it means to learn deeply in line with learning theory—should become
a prime consideration as the legal academy tackles its reinvention.45 It is
imperative that we equip our students with the skill set necessary to learn
effectively and efficiently, not only in law school, but in practice.
Thus, to best confront any challenging subject, be it civil procedure or
otherwise, all law students should be taught how to be self-regulated and
intentional learners who view it as their charge to learn for a lifetime. This
is a professional necessity. Helping law students to become more aware of,
to monitor, and to reflect on their learning processes will help them to better
discern what they know, need to know, and cannot know in attempting to
brain’s plasticity and adaptability, screen-based behaviors may be affecting its abilities to
“slow read,” and cognitive neuroscientists caution that humans “seem to be developing
digital brains with new circuits for skimming through the torrent of information online.
This alternative way of reading is competing with traditional deep reading circuitry
developed over several millennia.” Michael S. Rosenwald, Serious Reading Takes a Hit from
Online Scanning and Skimming, Researchers Say, Wash. Post (April 6, 2014), www.washingtonpost.
com/local/serious-reading-takes-a-hit-from-online-scanning-and-skimming-researcherssay/2014/04/06/088028d2-b5d2-11e3-b899-20667de76985_story.html.
43.

Susan Stuart & Ruth Vance, Bringing a Knife to the Gunfight: The Academically Underprepared Law
Student and Legal Education Reform, 48 Val. U. L. Rev. 41, 46 (2013) (noting that the “increasing
academic underpreparedness” of incoming law students is “becoming systemic rather than
singular.”).

44.

See Cheryl P. Preston, Penée Wood Stewart & Louise R. Moulding, Teaching “Thinking Like a
Lawyer”: Metacognition and Law Students, 2014 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1053, 1087 (2014).

45.

See infra Part IIC. See also Niedwiecki, Lawyers and Learning, supra note 39, at 34 (positing that
“[b]y introducing learning theory into the law school curriculum and specifically teaching
the students how to learn, law schools can extend the one-dimensional learning that is
currently central to the law school curriculum to one that focuses on teaching students to
transfer learned knowledge and skill to new and novel situations.”).
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make sound but creative professional judgments, both in and after law school.
This is the metacognitive task.
A. The Importance of Metacognition to Learning
Metacognition46 describes a higher level of cognition47 focused on knowing
about one’s learning or “thinking about thinking.”48 As one author explained,
“It’s like you have a big brain outside of your brain looking at what your
brain is doing.”49 And another: “It is this attention to how [one learns] that
gives rise to . . . the moment of meta in metacognition—that is, the moment
of standing above or apart from oneself . . . in order to turn one’s attention
back upon one’s own mental work.”50 Although the term has been used across
disciplines and sometimes with different variations, it is generally agreed that
metacognition involves both “students’ awareness of the processes they need to
successfully complete a task, and . . . students’ cognitive monitoring—the ability
to determine if the task is being completed correctly and make corrections as
appropriate.”51 As Professor Anthony Niedwiecki put it:
Metacognition also can be described as the internal voice people hear when
they are engaged in the learning process—the voice that will tell them what
they have to do to accomplish a task, what they already know, what they
do not know, how to match their previous learning to the new situation,
when they do not understand what they are reading or learning, and how to
evaluate their learning. It is this internal reflection and conscious control of
the learning process that goes to the heart of metacognition.52
46.

John Flavell, a pioneer in modern metacognitive research, defined metacognition as “one’s
knowledge concerning one’s own cognitive processes and products or anything related
to them, e.g., the learning-relevant properties of information or data.” John H. Flavell,
Metacognitive Aspects of Problem Solving, in The Nature of Intelligence 231, 232 (Lauren B.
Resnick, ed., 1976).

47.

Cognition involves the actual component skills that constitute the learning process, such
as retrieval, comprehension, analysis, and knowledge utilization. See John S. Kendall,
Susan Ryan, Sandra Weeks, Alan Alpert, Amitra Schwols & Laurie Moore, Thinking
& Learning Skills: What Do We Expect of Students? 2, 7-9 (2008), http://eric.
ed.gov/?id=ED544689.

48.

See Jennifer A. Livingston, Metacognition: An Overview 4 (2003), https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/234755498_Metacognition_An_Overview (observing that
“[m]etacognitive and cognitive strategies may overlap in that the same strategy, such as
questioning, could be regarded as either a cognitive or metacognitive strategy depending
on” why it is used, given that a reader could self-question both to obtain knowledge and to
monitor understanding of it).

49.

McGuire, supra note 41, at 16.

50.

Naomi Silver, Reflective Pedagogies and the Metacognitive Turn in College Teaching, in Using Reflection
and Metacognition to Improve Student Learning: Across the Disciplines, Across
the Academy 1, 1 (Matthew Kaplan, Naomi Silver, Danielle LaVaque-Manty & Deborah
Meizlish eds., 2013).

51.

Kolencik & Hillwig, supra note 14, at 5 (emphasis added).

52.

Anthony Niedwiecki, Teaching for Lifelong Learning: Improving the Metacognitive Skills of Law Students
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When students successfully engage in metacognition, they are more aware of
themselves as learners and are better able to judge and improve their learning
process.53 In this way, the insight and control metacognition provides can
promote not only deeper engagement with the subject, but an eagerness about
learning generally that goes “beyond a particular task or class” and positions
the student “to exploit this learning in the service of personal and professional
goals as well.”54
The specific benefits for law students of developing metacognitive skills
are many. First, there is notable support for the theory that integrating the
teaching of metacognitive skills with the teaching of substantive content can
improve students’ deep learning of the subject matter.55 Second, encouraging
law students to think about how they think better prepares them, in a broader
sense, for the higher-level skills required for sound academic and professional
judgments, including analysis, synthesis, and critical thinking.56 Third,
metacognition also supports the transfer of learning or the “ability to use
knowledge gained in one setting or situation in another,”57 including those that
Through More Effective Formative Assessment Techniques, 40 Cap. U. L. Rev. 149, 156-57 (2012)
[hereinafter Niedwiecki, Teaching for Lifelong Learning] (footnotes omitted).
53.

Silver, supra note 50, at 3 (noting that “[m]etacognition allows students to make decisions
about how they learn best by helping them become aware of what they are doing when they
are learning.”); Kolencik & Hillwig, supra note 14, at 7 (noting that “[s]tudies show that
increases in learning have followed direct instruction in metacognitive strategies.”); Paul
R. Pintrich, The Role of Metacognitive Knowledge in Learning, Teaching, and Assessing, 41 Theory into
Prac. 219, 219 (2002) (explaining that students “tend to learn better” when they “become
more aware of their own thinking as well as more knowledgeable about cognition in general”
and act on that awareness) (citation omitted).

54.

Silver, supra note 50, at 4.

55.

See Xiaodong Lin & Florence R. Sullivan, Computer Contexts for Supporting Metacognitive Learning,
in International Handbook of Information Technology in Primary and Secondary
Education 281, 285-87 (J. Voogt & G. Knezek, eds., 2008) (discussing how metacognitive
monitoring skills and content learning must “work in concert with one another” to improve
the subject understanding resulting in adaptive expertise); Pintrich, supra note 53, at 223
(noting that although metacognition can be taught in a separate course, to produce more
effective learning, “[i]t is more important that metacognitive knowledge is embedded
within the usual content-driven lessons in different subject areas” and not be “taught in the
abstract.”). See also McGuire, supra note 41, at 13 (discussing “immediate—and in some cases
remarkable—results” when she started teaching her chemistry students about the learning
process and how to improve their learning).

56.

E.g., Preston, Stewart & Moulding, supra note 44, at 1060 (noting that “metacognition is
important for the execution of higher-level thinking skills, such as analysis and synthesis”);
Carlo Magno, The Role of Metacognitive Skills in Developing Critical Thinking, 5 Metacognition
Learning 137, 149 (2010) (reporting the results of a study showing that “metacognition helps
in developing critical thinking, because it is likely that critical thinking requires a form of
meta-level operation”) (citation omitted).

57.

Pintrich, supra note 53, at 222. See also National Research Council, How People Learn:
Brain, Mind, Experience, and School 12 (John D. Bransford, Ann L. Brown & Rodney R.
Cocking, eds., 2000) [hereinafter How People Learn] (finding that “[t]eaching practices
congruent with a metacognitive approach to learning include those that focus on sense-
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students will face in practice.58 Relatedly, developing metacognitive skills can
better prepare law students to be self-reflective, lifelong learners throughout
their professional careers.59 Fourth, a metacognitive consciousness should
assist students in both seeing and making connections between the different
dimensions of professional work, promoting a deeper understanding of the
synergistic nature of professional judgment. Thus, teaching metacognitive
skills to law students can foster the integrative learning necessary for “making
those links between doctrine, skills, and values, between theory and practice,
and between the personal and professional facets of a more holistic and
authentic life as a problem-solving lawyer.”60
Important to note here is that learning involves not only cognition and
metacognition, but an affective aspect as well.61 Deep thinking about one’s
own thinking necessarily implicates awareness and monitoring of thoughts and
emotions. Correspondingly, teaching that does not engage the affective “may
result in relatively incomplete, temporary, and unsophisticated learning.”62 As
making, self-assessment, and reflection on what worked and what needs improving. These
practices have been shown to increase the degree to which students transfer their learning to
new settings and events.”) (citation omitted).
58.

Preston, Stewart & Moulding, supra note 44, at 1073-80 (describing how metacognition
enhances basic lawyering skills, relieves anxiety, and boosts confidence).

59.

See Niedwiecki, Teaching for Lifelong Learning, supra note 52, at 155 (asserting that “[t]he most
important skills law schools can teach students to make them better lifelong learners are
metacognitive strategies.”); cf. Nelson P. Miller, Mapping Lawyer Competencies onto the
Law School Curriculum to Confirm that Graduates Are Prepared to Practice Law (June 30,
2011) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2461037 (listing metacognition
as a lawyer competency).

60.

Patti Alleva & Laura Rovner, Seeking Integrity: Learning Integratively from Classroom Controversy, 42
Sw. L. Rev. 355, 372 (2013) (offering a definition of integrated learning and exploring the
meaning of that term in the context of addressing classroom controversies as prototypically
integrative experiences). See also Xiaodong Lin, Daniel L. Schwartz & Giyoo Hatano, Toward
Teachers’ Adaptive Metacognition, 40 Educ. Psychol. 245, 249 (2005) (noting that metacognition
can be a mechanism for identity building and value clarification).

61.

See Caroline Maughan, Why Study Emotion?, in Affect and Legal Education: Emotion in
Learning and Teaching the Law 11, 17 (Paul Maharg & Caroline Maughan, eds., 2011)
(noting that “[i]n higher education the role of emotions in learning has largely been ignored
and certainly under-theorised. Yet all participants in the educational process recognise,
both explicitly and implicitly, the significance of the non-cognitive and its influence on
student learning and behaviour.”) (footnote omitted). See also Vermunt, supra note 2, at
26 (explaining that “[a]ffective learning activities are directed at coping with the feelings
that arise during learning, and lead to an emotional state that may positively, neutrally or
negatively affect the progression of a learning process. Examples are motivating oneself,
attributing learning results to causal factors, attaching subjective appraisals to learning tasks
and getting blocking emotions under control.”) (emphasis omitted); Maksymilian Del Mar,
Legal Understanding and the Affective Imagination, in Affect and Legal Education: Emotion in
Learning and Teaching the Law 177, 177 (Paul Maharg & Caroline Maughan, eds., 2011)
(noting that “[w]hen we learn the law, we learn emotionally; further, what we are learning
has emotional content.”).

62.

Nancy L. Chick, Terri Karis & Cyndi Kernahan, Learning from Their Own Learning: How
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one author observed: “It is now widely accepted that students’ worries and fears
about studying are not necessarily only to do with course content; often they
are about motivation, feelings about self-esteem, self-efficacy, fear of failure,
security, fitting in, well-being, boredom, and so on.”63 Encouraging students
to examine both what they are thinking and feeling as part of introspection
about learning puts them in closer touch with the reality that their internal
reactions and past experiences may be affecting not only how they learn,
but who they are and might become as professional beings.64 This promotes
self-awareness generally, an important element for developing professional
identity and judgment.65 This, in turn, may broaden students’ recognition that
they live and work as lawyers in relation to others—especially their clients.66
Prompting these realizations is nothing short of critical in helping law students
to enrich professional judgments and relationships, to harmonize personal
with professional insights and values, and to strengthen their capacities for
meaningful and satisfying professional lives.
Despite considerable research establishing the value of teaching
metacognitive skills from elementary school years onward, it would be a mistake
to assume that all law students have already been taught metacognitive skills,
that they know how to use metacognitive strategies to improve their learning,
or that they are even aware of metacognition when they enter law school.67 In
all likelihood, students begin law school with varying levels of metacognitive
proficiency.68 A recent study aimed at measuring the metacognitive aptitude
Metacognitive and Meta-Affective Reflections Enhance Learning in Race-Related Courses, 3 Int’l J.
Scholarship Teaching & Learning, 1, 4 (2009) (describing use of meta-affective activities
to enhance learning about race).
63.

Maughan, supra note 61, at 24.

64.

Cf. Del Mar, supra note 61, at 177 (advocating that “the learning experience can be greatly
enhanced by teachers becoming more aware of the role of the emotions in learning law.”).

65.

See Patti Alleva, The Personal As Predicate, 81 N.D. L. Rev. 683, 689-91 (2005) (noting the
importance of teaching to self-awareness and encouraging metacognition). See also
Del Mar, supra note 61, at 187 (observing that “[t]he life of the law is, to a great extent,
about the emotional life of a community; about its emotional relationships, its troubles
and temptations, its conflicts and forms of resolving them. . . . A lawyer must be able to
understand affectively—i.e. to explore the infinitely possible affective dimensions of—the
pictures that are associated with certain terms or phrases . . . .”).

66.

See Alleva & Rovner, supra note 60, at 375 (noting that “[t]he professional, as fiduciary, does
not enjoy the unadulterated luxury of self-indulgence or isolation. She or he must think, act,
and value in relation to others, especially client and community.”).

67.

See Jennifer McCabe, Metacognitive Awareness of Learning Strategies in Undergraduates, 39 Memory
& Cognition 462, 462 (2011) (describing two studies of undergraduate students giving low
marks to their levels of metacognitive awareness).

68.

Niedwiecki, Lawyers and Learning, supra note 39, at 45 (noting that students often come to law
school with metacognitive deficiencies); Pintrich, supra note 53, at 223 (noting “[continual
surprise] at the number of students who come to college having very little metacognitive
knowledge; knowledge about different strategies, different cognitive tasks, and, particularly,
accurate knowledge about themselves.”).
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of students at one law school confirmed that even top students in the entering
class did not exhibit well-developed metacognitive skills.69
These findings have critical implications for both the academic and practice
worlds. As Professors Cheryl Preston, Penée Wood Stewart, and Louise
Moulding have recognized:
Metacognitive skills improve oral communication, written communication,
the deciphering of complex texts, and the ability to see the nuanced factual
connections that help a lawyer build a case from a set of facts. Metacognitive
thinkers develop a pattern for approaching and unraveling thinking problems,
which gives them confidence in new situations and helps relieve stress. These
skills are particularly pertinent to the practice of law.70

Thus, given the importance of metacognition to both learning and law
practice, law faculty should give serious consideration to the teaching of
metacognitive skills more intentionally and pervasively throughout the entire
curriculum, including in doctrinal courses like civil procedure.71 Highlighting
the importance of thinking about learning as a natural part of the first-year
curriculum sends the strong signal that how a law student learns matters—and,
in fact, like civil procedure itself, reinforces the primacy of process in mastering
substance.
B. Integrating the Teaching of Metacognitive Skills into Doctrinal Classes to Enhance
Intentional Learning
We recognize at the outset that law professors, particularly those who teach
first-year doctrinal courses, primarily expect students to demonstrate the
basic cognitive skills necessary to master their courses. Understandably, legal
educators have traditionally focused on teaching the substantive content and
developing the skills related to that content, and less on teaching how to most
effectively learn that content. Further, teaching metacognitive skills in substantive
law classes may increase the pressure on professors already concerned about
how to cover the desired depth and breadth of material, especially in a onesemester civil procedure course.
From the student vantage point, there is also the potential additional
challenge of thinking about thinking while simultaneously learning course
69.

See Preston, Stewart & Moulding, supra note 44, at 1054. In the authors’ study, first-year law
students from the entering classes of Fall 2010 and Fall 2013 at the J. Reuben Clark Law
School at Brigham Young University were given the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory
(MAI), a self-report questionnaire commonly used in metacognitive studies. Id. at 1063,
1066. Notably, the law students entering in 2010 had a median GPA of 3.75 and a median
LSAT score of 164 and those entering in 2013 had a median GPA of 3.77 and a median
LSAT score of 161. Id. at 1064. Despite these indicators for future success in law school, the
authors’ review of the MAI responses established “that the metacognitive skills of many, and
probably most, entering law students are weak.” Id. at 1057.

70.

Id. at 1080.

71.

Preston, Stewart & Moulding, supra note 44, at 1056 (arguing that “law schools should adopt
teaching methods that directly teach metacognitive skills.”).
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substance. It is hard enough to learn civil procedure doctrine while attempting
to purposefully track and evaluate one’s learning of that doctrine. Initially,
students may complain that adding or surfacing the metacognitive layer
might affirmatively interfere with learning because it is distracting, inefficient,
and time-consuming on their end, taking attention and energy away from
mastering the substance. Moreover, studies also indicate that students may be
inaccurate in their metacognitive knowledge about their own learning, which
may limit the utility of the concept unless there is appropriate instructional
support for their self-assessment efforts.72
There are, however, a number of countervailing considerations that counsel
strongly in favor of teaching to metacognition. To start, it may not be as
onerous to integrate as one might think.73 The metacognitive task need not be
overly complicated, and simple illustrations might suffice for introducing the
skill to first-year students.74 Also, the class time a professor devotes to these
exercises might be minimized by flipping some or all of this instruction out of
class. And the reality is that a number of law professors have already zeroed in
on the importance of metacognitive skills to learning or incorporated teaching
to those skills in their classes.75 Others may be supporting their students’
72.

John Dunlosky & Janet Metcalfe, Metacognition 32 (2009), citing John H. Flavell,
Metacognition and Cognitive Monitoring: A New Area of Cognitive-Developmental Inquiry, 34 Am. Psychol.
906, 908 (1979) (observing that “[metacognitive knowledge] can be inaccurate, can fail to
be activated when needed, can fail to have much or any influence when activated, and can
fail to have a beneficial or adaptive effect when influential”); cf. Xiaodong Lin-Siegler, David
Shaenfield & Anastasia D. Elder, Contrasting Case Instruction Can Improve Self-Assessment of Writing,
63 Educ. Tech. Res. Dev. 517 (2015) (discussing results of study showing that students could
improve their self-assessment skills through use of effective instructional supports).

73.

Livingston, supra note 48, at 2 (explaining that metacognition is “not as daunting a concept
as it might seem. We engage in metacognitive activities everyday.”); Dunlosky & Metcalfe,
supra note 72, at 1 (observing that “[a]lthough the term [metacognition] itself may seem
mysterious, metacognitive acts are common”).

74.

Infra text at notes 84-96.

75.

See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Bloom, A Law School Game Changer: (Trans)formative Feedback, 41 Ohio N.
U. L. Rev. 227 (2015) [hereinafter Bloom, A Law School Game Changer] (suggesting concrete
formative assessment exercises designed to enable students to become successful, selfregulated learners); Preston, Stewart & Moulding, supra note 44 (discussing the importance
of metacognitive skills for law students and lawyers); E. Scott Fruehwald, How to Help Students
From Disadvantaged Backgrounds Succeed in Law School, 1 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 83 (2013) (discussing
how to teach law students metacognitive awareness and regulatory skills to enhance selfregulated learning); Niedwiecki, Teaching for Lifelong Learning, supra note 52 (discussing the use
of formative assessment to promote metacognition); Tonya Kowalski, True North: Navigating
for the Transfer of Learning in Legal Education, 34 Seattle U. L. Rev. 51, 101 (2010) (describing
metacognitive reflection as the “gold standard of transfer tools”); Kristina L. Niedringhaus,
Teaching Better Research Skills by Teaching Metacognitive Ability, 18 Perspectives 113 (2010) (offering
techniques for teaching metacognitive awareness in legal research classes); Niedwiecki,
Lawyers and Learning, supra note 39, at 41-68 (detailing the concept of metacognition and
suggesting ways to incorporate metacognitive learning in the law school curriculum); Robin
A. Boyle, Employing Active-Learning Techniques and Metacognition in Law School: Shifting Energy from
Professor to Student, 81 U. of Det. Mercy L. Rev. 1, 13-17, 19-20 (2003) (describing various
active-learning and metacognitive techniques used in class); Nancy Millich, Building Blocks of
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metacognitive learning strategies even if they are not consciously aware of
doing so. For them, it is but a short step to be more intentional about what they
already do, which can facilitate even greater learning gains for their students.
But perhaps more important, a professor’s integration of the explicit
teaching of metacognitive skills within a doctrinal course ultimately serves
to position students to be successful, self-regulated learners in that class.76
Metacognition, in effect, offers another method for them to learn the specific
course content more deeply—a method with benefits beyond the boundaries
of any particular classroom.77 Thus, student investment in the additional time
and attention spent on becoming more metacognitive can pay off in deeper
content learning and enhanced transfer capabilities within that subject.
Further, for some students who may already employ metacognitive strategies
without knowing that they do, naming the concept will help them to be more
conscious about reiterating and refining those strategies. Moreover, teaching
metacognitive skills, especially during the first year, will help position students
for greater success in their upper-level classes and, ultimately, for the practice
of law.78 To assist with these ends, we next offer a few well-established methods
for teaching metacognition, tailored for use in civil procedure classes.
Being Explicit About Metacognition. Teachers who want to “teach for, of, and
about thinking” must pave the way by establishing a climate for doing so.79
Being explicit about metacognition increases the likelihood that students
will take greater responsibility for practicing these skills. Particularly if law
students lack exposure to metacognition in their prior educational experiences,
the professor should explain why it is important for deeper learning of the
substantive material, especially given students’ natural and understandable
Analysis: Using Simple “Sesame Street Skills” and Sophisticated Educational Learning Theories in Teaching a
Seminar in Legal Analysis and Writing, 34 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1127 (1994) (using metacognition
and other learning strategies to benefit students who had trouble with legal analysis and
exam taking); Paul T. Wangerin, Learning Strategies for Law Students, 52 Alb. L. Rev. 471 (1988)
(highlighting the importance of metacognition to learning). See also Carnegie Report,
supra note 6, at 109-11 (noting that legal writing and clinical faculty employ metacognitive
coaching and modeling strategies to improve student performance).
76.

See generally Wangerin, supra note 75 (offering metacognitive strategies that can be taught in
substantive law courses to help make students more “autonomous” learners and to facilitate
their understanding of the substantive law).

77.

See Niedwiecki, Lawyers and Learning, supra note 39, at 41 (explaining that integrating
metacognitive strategies into the curriculum “will enhance the teaching of how to ‘think like
a lawyer’ while also teaching students how to ‘learn like a lawyer.’”). See also McCabe, supra
note 67, at 474 (positing that “educational intervention, in the form of targeted instruction
on learning and memory topics, may have the potential to improve metacognitive awareness
of factors associated with academic success.”).

78.

Preston, Stewart & Moulding, supra note 44, at 1073-80 (discussing the importance of
metacognitive skills to lawyering).

79.

Kolencik & Hillwig, supra note 14, at 8.
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inclination to prioritize their learning to that end.80 In addition, the professor
might explain how she intends to integrate the teaching of metacognitive
skills during the course by providing a roadmap of metacognitive exercises
that will be required of students, as indicated in the syllabus or in materials
to be introduced.81 As one learning theorist put it: “The shared language and
discourse about cognition and learning among peers and between students
and teacher helps students become more aware of their own metacognitive
knowledge as well as their own strategies for learning and thinking.”82 This
explicitness also helps to demystify the learning process.83
Modeling Metacognitive Skills. Students benefit from practicing metacognitive
skills when that practice has been modeled first by their teacher.84 Sometimes
referred to as a professor’s “think-aloud,” legal educators have recognized
the value of sharing the thinking steps that an expert follows to successfully
complete a specific learning task.85 In the context of teaching metacognitive
skills, the teacher describes what is going on in her mind in thinking about her
thinking, demonstrating the process before asking students to try it.86
80.

See Pintrich, supra note 53, at 223 (stressing the importance of teaching metacognition
explicitly, especially given “the number of students who come to college having very little
metacognitive knowledge . . . .”).

81.

It may also help to briefly revisit the benefits of metacognition the first few times the
professor reintroduces the skill during the course, or to establish a catchphrase to invoke
the concept whenever the professor wishes to activate or reference the process amidst a
substantive discussion (e.g., “let’s pause and ‘go meta’ to think about the thinking we just
shared with one another in analyzing the shift of burdens from movant to non-movant on
a Rule 56 motion”). Two leading learning theorists have used this phrase in a different,
but instructive, pedagogic context. Cf. Pat Hutchings & Lee S. Shulman, The Scholarship of
Teaching: New Elaborations, New Developments, Change, Sept.–Oct. 1999, at 10, 13 (noting that
the scholarship of teaching “requires a kind of ‘going meta,’ in which faculty frame and
systematically investigate questions related to student learning . . . .”).

82.

Pintrich, supra note 53, at 223. See also Kolencik & Hillwig, supra note 14, at 13-18 (examining
the importance of using specific “language that implements the teaching of thinking” and
offering examples of “metacognitive talk” to help the teacher “model the metacognitive
awareness that students need to develop.”).

83.

See Pintrich, supra note 53, at 223.

84.

Id. at 224 (discussing the importance of modeling strategies to assist students with learning
metacognitive skills).

85.

E.g., Fruehwald, supra note 75, at 111-12 (discussing modeling of strategies for how to
approach legal analysis and problem-solving); Leah M. Christensen, The Psychology Behind Case
Briefing: A Powerful Cognitive Schema, 29 Campbell L. Rev. 5, 22-23 (2006) (suggesting how a
professor might “think aloud” to demonstrate reading a case); Debra Moss Curtis & Judith
R. Karp, “In a Case, In a Book, They Will Not Take a Second Look!” Critical Reading in the Legal Writing
Classroom, 41 Willamette L. Rev. 293, 305-13 (2005) (surveying various methods for teaching
metacognitive strategies such as “think-alouds” to develop students’ critical reading skills).
See also Mary A. Lundeberg, Metacognitive Aspects of Reading Comprehension: Studying Understanding
in Legal Case Analysis, 22 Reading Res. Q. 407 (1987) (reporting on a study demonstrating
how legal novices benefited in reading opinions by using guidelines based on metacognitive
strategies derived from the reading protocols of legal experts).

86.

Kolencik & Hillwig, supra note 14, at 21-23 (describing the method of “thinking aloud” to
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For example: A civil procedure professor might use this modeling method
in an exercise designed to debunk the belief that a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure represents “black-letter law” not open to interpretation.87 The
professor might begin by asking students to review the text of a specific rule
which has confounded them in this way (perhaps as revealed on a recent
assessment) and ask students to write their own brief interpretation of its
meaning. Then, the professor can demonstrate her review of the rule’s text for
the class, pausing preliminarily to ask and then answer for herself the question,
“What learning steps are involved in determining the meaning of a Federal
Rule?” She may first decide to explore certain terms or phrases from the rule’s
text, and “think aloud” about why she started with the rule’s language and
how she initially interprets one or more of those terms.
The professor might then pause and ask herself out loud whether there might
be other interpretations of the rule. This is a moment when the professor might
self-question why she may have too easily landed on the initial interpretation,
noting that her experiences, values, feelings, or political persuasions might
have “blinded” her to alternative interpretations. At this point, the professor
might pause and ask students to share their initial interpretations of the rule,
encouraging them to reflect on the personal factors that might have influenced
those interpretations.88 That survey of responses can illustrate the range of ways
that different people might read the same language in a rule, underscoring the
importance of self-monitoring initial interpretations.
The professor can turn then to a demonstration of how she tests her
learning by examining various authorities that offer interpretations of the
rule. In addition, she can illustrate how the meaning of the rule is ultimately
a function of its application to a given set of facts—a process that, in turn,
implicates the underlying purpose of the rule and the subjectivity stemming
from both the decision-maker and the peculiar circumstances of the case.
She might then summarize the learning strategies revealed or yet to be
undertaken, indicating that interpreting a rule requires looking all around
teach metacognitive strategy).
87.

See supra text at Part I (describing the third civil procedure learning challenge).

88.

Professor Paul Maharg vividly describes when students, in seeking to understand
“disciplinary text” (“the text as object”), struggle “to make that powerful discourse part of
their own voice” (“the text as subject”) in attempting to mediate personal with professional
dimensions of learning:
The object on the legal textbook page, so polished, neutral, candid yet arcane, bears
little mark of any such struggle: it has been stripped of emotion. Readers and writers,
though, come to the text object with prior emotions about the text, about what to
do with it, about their organic lives around the text. . . . The past and its affective
freight cannot be ignored; present experience beyond the text presses in upon the
reading experience; the academic future lies beyond and is dependent on the student’s
struggle with the text.
Paul Maharg, Space, Absence, Silence: The Intimate Dimensions of Legal Learning, in Affect and Legal
Education: Emotion in Learning and Teaching the Law 283, 284-85 (Paul Maharg &
Caroline Maughan, eds., 2011).
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it—to other rules, to advisory committee notes, to the cases interpreting the
rule, to the subjective processes of applying it to a peculiar set of facts, and
to the purposes guiding that application. The ultimate goal is to slow down
what normally is instantaneous analysis for the expert metacognitive thinker.
This requires freezing the frames at critical steps along the chain of reasoning,
self-interrogating assumptions and interpretations, and making visible the
learning process itself, thus demonstrating how adjustments, if needed, can
improve understanding.
Providing Questions to Encourage Metacognition. After laying the groundwork by
modeling it, the professor can reinforce the critical metacognitive skill of selfquestioning by encouraging students to engage in it on their own in order
to build awareness about their learning.89 Strategic self-questioning is not
necessarily innate, and may need to be developed and refined.90 Teachers can
provide a list of targeted questions designed to facilitate deeper metacognitive
sensitivity by asking students to self-diagnose their grasp of difficult material
in order to determine what they understand, and to monitor where they are
struggling, and why.
For example: A civil procedure professor might provide students with a
set of questions to assist them in gaining an understanding of what they are
learning (or not learning) about the Erie doctrine and its relationship to the
notion of overlapping state and federal sovereigns and judicial systems.91
Students can be encouraged to test their understanding through queries that
help situate the substance of Erie in more of a learning-process framework
(that emphasizes context, connection, and application) in order to help them
organize their thinking in constructing the doctrine for themselves:
• Do I understand why we are studying the Erie doctrine at this point in the
semester?
• Can I clearly articulate what an Erie question is?
• What other course concepts might help me to answer this question?
• Do I understand what types of situations trigger an Erie problem?
• Am I able to articulate what types of cases do not pose Erie issues?
• Am I able to identify the federal constitutional dimensions of an Erie question
and isolate the implicated constitutional provisions? Can I articulate why these
provisions are pertinent? If not, why can’t I?
• Am I able to identify the federal statutory dimensions of an Erie question and
isolate the implicated enactments? Can I articulate why these provisions are
pertinent? If not, why can’t I?
• Am I able to identify the sequence of steps a federal court might take under Erie
to determine whether it should apply state or federal law in a diversity case?
89.

See generally Kolencik & Hillwig, supra note 14, at 101-14 (exploring the use of “thinking with
questioning” as a technique to enhance metacognition).

90.

Id. at 101.

91.

See supra text at Part I (describing the fifth civil procedure learning challenge).
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• Do I understand the strategies I should use for applying the Erie analysis to a new
fact pattern? How can I assess the true level of my comprehension in this area,
and not just what I think I now know?
• If I can’t articulate the basic Erie question or problem on my own, what else could
I do? What sources might I consult?
• Have I put the necessary time into mastering this difficult series of cases?
• What, if any, emotional reactions did I have to the material, and did that affect my
ability to understand it? For example, did I give up because I was frustrated? If
so, how might I manage this and any other emotional reactions going forward?

These are just some of the questions that can assist students to monitor
and evaluate their learning of a difficult doctrine. At least initially, students
should be encouraged to share their responses to these types of questions so
the professor can assist with judging the accuracy and comprehensiveness
of the students’ self-assessment of their learning process. Teachers can then
ask students to practice this type of self-interrogation on their own, getting
them into the habit of running down a similar mental checklist of questions
whenever they find themselves up against troubling substantive concepts.92
To reinforce the importance of this strategy from a different angle, a teacher
might conclude the course by posing new questions designed to encourage
students to reflect on their learning trajectory over the course of the semester.93
Using Assessment to Encourage Monitoring of Learning. Particularly in classes
that include only a final exam and perhaps a midterm, students often lack
enough extrinsic opportunities to monitor their learning. To help remedy this
problem, teachers can offer benchmarks, such as grading rubrics or checklists
of expected skills, for students to use as the basis for self-assessment of their
learning.94 Likewise, a formative assessment, such as a practice test, can be used
as a platform to further students’ metacognitive understanding of their content
learning. Specifically, a professor may create a metaquestion set that assists
students to prompt the necessary self-assessment of their learning process and
performance concerning that practice test (as opposed to prompting solely
a content review of what they got right or wrong).95 These questions might
include:
92.

See Kolencik & Hillwig, supra note 14, at 105-13 (discussing the importance of a student’s
use of questions while learning, including those relating to comprehension, connections and
contrasts, strategies or approaches, and reflection).

93.

See Niedwiecki, Teaching for Lifelong Learning, supra note 52, at 192 (describing a course-end selfassessment tool to help evaluate learning for the entire course and to set future learning
goals). Cf. id. at 185-86 n.238 (suggesting a series of metacognitive questions in the context of
portfolios for students to reflect on their learning process and progress).

94.

E.g., Shirley Lung, The Problem Method: No Simple Solution, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 723, 759-60
(2009) (proposing a number of prompts for students to encourage post-problem reflection
about learning and to internalize metacognitive habits of self-questioning); Floyd, Griffin
& Sneddon, supra note 28, at 300-04 (describing self-assessment worksheets for written
assignments to encourage self-reflection about learning).

95.

See Bloom, A Law School Game Changer, supra note 75, at 231 (suggesting that formative
assessment can be used to assess more than pure content knowledge, but also to help
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• What did I do to prepare for the assessment? Was that preparation adequate?
What could I do differently next time to ensure a more successful result?
• Did I read the call of the question carefully? If not, why not? What can I do next
time to ensure that I do so more successfully?
• Did I skip over important facts in the question? How did I determine which facts
were relevant and which facts were not? What methods might I use to be sure I
read more closely during my next assessment?
• Did I get distracted during the assessment? If so, why? How can I avoid this
problem in the future?
• Did I make any faulty assumptions in responding to the questions? If so, what
were they, and why were they faulty? How can I avoid this problem in the
future?
• What emotions did I experience while preparing to take this assessment? Did
they influence how I performed?

The idea going forward is that students would use these questions in advance
of and during the next assessment to monitor and self-correct to avoid prior
pitfalls.96
*
*
*
Helping students to learn intentionally, especially through the use of
metacognitive strategies that highlight the connection among learning,
professional development, and personal growth, reinforces the significance of
learning as an end in itself. Assisting students to “learn to learn to think like
lawyers,”97 so that they experience firsthand the benefits of a self-conscious
learning process, is a powerful way to both convey and ennoble that process.
Hopefully, the meta self-dialogue of deep learning will become ever more
students develop the skills necessary to be self-regulated learners); Niedwiecki, Teaching for
Lifelong Learning, supra note 52, at 175-93 (describing how formative assessment coupled with
self-assessment and self-regulation can be used to improve metacognitive skills); Andrea A.
Curcio, Gregory Todd Jones & Tanya M. Washington, Does Practice Make Perfect? An Empirical
Examination of the Impact of Practice Essays on Essay Exam Performance, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 271, 313
(2008) (reporting on a study suggesting that “students learn better when given opportunities
to practice a skill and receive feedback on that practice” (though some benefit more than
others) and that combining metacognitive exercises with teaching methods may help to
improve all student performances).
96.

Carol Springer Sargent & Andrea A. Curcio, Empirical Evidence that Formative Assessments Improve
Final Exams, 61 J. Legal Educ. 379, 400-01 (2012) (showing the importance “shifting the
law school culture away from a single summative assessment” and of using feedback on
formative assessments to help students develop metacognitive strategies to spot and fix
learning weaknesses). See also Stanton, Neider, Gallegos & Clark, supra note 15 (tracking
metacognitive regulation in college biology students through post-exam self-evaluation
assignments). The authors found that “nearly all of the students were willing to reflect [on]
and adjust their study plans, but many did not identify appropriate learning strategies, and
many did not carry out their new plans.” Id. at 11. Thus, post-exam assignments encouraged
metacognitive regulation, but many students needed additional metacognitive assistance to
benefit from these exercises.

97.

Wegner, supra note 13, at 203.
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instinctual the more students engage it and come to understand and feel the
power of making informed learning choices—a pattern of introspection and
conscious correction we hope students will import into the practice arena
when they problem-solve and attempt to make informed legal choices in the
exercise of professional judgment.
C. Building Institutional Respect for Learning About Learning
Building greater respect for learning as an end in itself cannot be achieved
solely by teaching metacognitive skills in one or two classes. The Carnegie
Report identified the need for “institutional intentionality” and endorsed the
view that law schools should refocus their curricula and assessment practices
around the “twin goals” of student learning and faculty improvement, designed
to “help students learn—and also learn to learn.”98 As Professors David Moss
and Debra Moss Curtis suggested in their overview of recent curricular
redesign efforts in law schools, law faculties should:
shift the conversation away from teaching and toward one of learning as a
means to address issues of reform. In short, learning theory (how individuals
learn) should drive curriculum and instruction. Such a perspective will shift
the emphasis away from teachers and toward the needs of our students as adult
learners. It will encourage us to ask what motivates our students to learn.99

Thus, the legal academy must recognize its inherent responsibility as educators
of lawyers to foster respect for and understanding of the learning process itself
as a professional imperative—both in educational and practice settings.100
Integrating metacognitive skills within individual classes is an important step
toward this goal,101 but it does not ensure that every student receives adequate
instruction about and repeated opportunities to practice how to learn.
Dedicated Curricular Outcome. The ultimate show of respect for learning as an
end in itself might be for a law school to simultaneously adopt a programmatic
goal to teach students how to learn about their learning and a corresponding
98.

See Carnegie Report, supra note 6, at 181 (citation omitted).

99.

David M. Moss & Debra Moss Curtis, Essential Elements for the Reform of Legal Education,
in Reforming Legal Education: Law Schools at the Crossroads 224 (David M.
Moss & Debra Moss Curtis eds., 2012). See also Maharg, supra note 88, at 300 (calling for
improvements in learning the law, especially in the “affective domain,” by “bring[ing]
together the paradigms of education and educational psychology with the natural science
basis of neuroscience.”).

100. Patti Alleva, Respect Is Key to Teaching, and Also to Learning, Nat’l L. J. 16 (Sept. 29, 2014) (noting
that teaching respectfully “involves honoring learning as an end in itself, and not merely as
a prelude to doing something else. This can be done in part by teaching students the basics
of how people learn. Understanding that learning is a skill not only helps students while in
law school, but better prepares them for the lifelong teaching and learning at the heart of
practicing law.”).
101. See Preston, Stewart & Moulding, supra note 44, at 1056 (noting that “metacognition
undoubtedly will become a major component in any successful law school reform”).
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learning outcome focusing on their capacity to self-consciously know and
monitor themselves as learners.102 Indeed, nearly a decade ago, Professor Roy
Stuckey and his co-authors proposed that best practices for setting goals of
a law school’s program of instruction should involve helping students to
acquire the attributes of effective, responsible lawyers, including self-reflection
and lifelong learning skills, so that law graduates are “skillful in planning
their learning by setting goals and identifying strategies for learning” and
have the ability “to implement those strategies, monitoring and reflecting on
their learning efforts as they work, and making any necessary adjustments in
those strategies.”103 Especially with the ABA’s recent curricular directives on
learning outcomes and programmatic evaluation, every law school now has
an unparalleled opportunity to consciously consider whether it should make
an express programmatic commitment (if it hasn’t already) to teach and assess
basic tenets of learning theory, especially the importance of metacognitive
strategies to deep learning.104 Such a capstone recognition would explicitly
legitimize the study of learning as part of the faculty’s collective obligation (and
102. See Neil W. Hamilton, Verna Monson & Jerome M. Organ, Encouraging Each Student’s Personal
Responsibility for Core Competencies Including Professionalism, 21 Prof. Law. 1, 9 (2012) (proposing
that law schools “[i]dentify student educational needs (including the meta-cognitive
capacities of self directed learning and self-regulation capacity)” and “[a]rticulate student
learning outcomes (educational objectives) that respond to student educational needs”).
See also George, supra note 42, at 181 (“encouraging or teaching students to learn about their
own metacognition would be an excellent addition to the first year curriculum.”) (footnote
omitted).
103. See Stuckey et al., supra note 39, at 65-66. Cf. Carolyn Wilkes Kaas with Cynthia Batt, Dena
Bauman, & Daniel Schaffzin, Delivering Effective Education in Externship Programs, in Building
on Best Practices, supra note 9, 216, 228-29 (proposing as an externship course learning
goal “Learning How to Learn, Think, and Make Choices for the Future”). As Moss and
Curtis have suggested: “Ideally, the defining elements for law school curriculum should be
grounded in the host of metacognitive skills that support the development of expert-level
thinking paired with substantial experiences with the law. Thus, the notion of reflection
becomes a key element of promoting learning for schools of law. One means to promote
this would be the requirement that new course proposals explicitly reference the various
pedagogical approaches for a new course in addition to the traditional content outline. Such
a more holistic course proposal review system will help ensure that a course is not merely
rigorous in terms of doctrinal substance, but acknowledges the broader notions of authentic
learning and the necessary classroom culture to bring that to life.” Moss & Curtis, supra note
99, at 225-26.
104. Some law schools have already begun to adopt learning outcomes or objectives that
include skills necessary for lifelong learning, such as self-reflection about one’s learning.
See, e.g., Learning Outcomes for Graduating Law Students, Maurice A. Deane School of
Law at Hofstra University, http://law.hofstra.edu/_site_support/files/pdf/academics/
academicresources/learningoutcomes/learning-outcomes.pdf (stating “each graduating
student must have demonstrated proficiency in . . . learning from experience through selfcritique”). We propose a more explicit programmatic commitment that calls for teaching
students to learn about their own learning and for them to understand and practice
metacognitive skills.
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increase the likelihood that work in this area would be counted for promotion
and tenure purposes)105 as well as signal a law school’s acknowledgment of the
subject’s importance to legal education and the practice of law.
In addition to instruction in individual classes, the subject of learning about
learning might be covered in a separate short course or workshop on learning
theory, or as part of a faculty-led orientation session, preferably at the start of
the first year, so that the entire class is exposed to learning how to learn from
the outset of the law school experience.106 Assigned materials could provide
critical background on the foundations of learning theory and stress the
importance of metacognition and self-regulation to the type of deep learning
required by legal professionals. These materials could also include illustrations
of metacognitive strategies, perhaps through the use of tailored metaquestion
sets concerning basic study approaches in law school or particularly difficult
topics in each of the first-year courses. Alternatively, in the second or third
years, law faculty might discuss ways to introduce metacognitive skills not
only in their classes, but through cocurricular methods such as collaborative
workshops that teach metacognitive skills in connection with problem-based
exercises targeting integrated learning in the context of professional judgment
formation. Ideally, learning about learning would become a pervasive focus
throughout the law school experience.
Learning Strategies Doubling for Lawyering Strategies. Another way for legal
educators to show respect for the learning process itself is to explicitly impress
upon students that certain pedagogic strategies intentionally used to facilitate
learning in the law school classroom double for the same strategies needed to
succeed in law practice. Teaching about learning is really teaching about the
necessity of learning as a skill of lawyering, thereby directly linking learning
theory to professional competence. Making express this connection highlights
both the intrinsic and the functional value of learning about learning. It also
creates an opportunity to note the doubling effect of teaching—that lawyers
are as much teachers as learners, in that they simultaneously learn from and
provide instruction for clients, judges, jurors, opposing counsel, and parties.
Thus, paying attention to all sides of the learning partnership is pertinent to
professional success. Doubling provides a vehicle to reinforce this critical
point in any class at any time.
Of course, teaching students metacognitive skills is an important illustration
of the doubling effect, given their parallel utility in law practice. Consider, as
another example, small-group discussions. On the academic side, intentionally
teaching students the communication and relational skills necessary to function
effectively in small classroom groups mirrors precisely the types of skills they
105. Cf. Hutchings & Shulman, supra note 81, at 13 (proposing that “all faculty have an obligation
to teach well, to engage students, and to foster important forms of student learning—not that
this is easily done.”) (emphasis in original).
106. See George, supra note 42, at 180-84 (proposing that all students be taught about the level
of learning required in law school, metacognition, the risks of cognitive overload and
multitasking, and successful learning and studying techniques).
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will need on the practice side to function effectively in client or law firm
committee meetings or in other gatherings of legal professionals.107 Similarly,
using guidelines for class discussion (predominantly in seminar courses)
serves a dual purpose: They can help to promote thoughtful, productive, and
courteous classroom conversation, and simultaneously model or reinforce
certain understandings or skills essential to the practicing professional.
These types of guidelines could include, when communicating, the need for
self- and other-awareness, respectfulness, active listening, open-mindedness,
nondefensiveness, authenticity, and humility. These skills are critical for
learning and for teaching, as they promote the capacity to receive and to
instruct or persuade. Thus, on the classroom side, these guidelines promote
safe, respectful, yet critical conversation while doubling as aspirational
standards for realistic and responsible professional discourse.
Teacher Metacognition. Yet another way to promote respect for learning about
learning in law school is for professors to model the same learning behavior
they expect from their students. This requires teachers to make conscious
efforts to educate themselves about how people learn and to think about the
effectiveness of their teaching on student learning.108 Being metacognitive
about one’s teaching involves the explicit engagement of metacognitive
practice through awareness and monitoring of teaching strategies, conditions,
effectiveness, and self.109 It includes planning what and how to teach,
monitoring the lesson while teaching it, making adjustments, if necessary,
and evaluating the lesson for purposes of future improvement.110 In short, it
involves knowing oneself as a teacher and as a learner. Teaching, after all, is
a process of learning for the instructor.111 When legal educators embrace their
identity as learners, it follows that they would benefit from developing their own
107. Cf. Eileen Scallen, Sophie Sparrow & Cliff Zimmerman, Working Together in Law:
Teamwork and Small Group Skills for Legal Professionals (2014) (exploring the
collaborative skills necessary for successful teamwork in law practice).
108. As Wegner observed: “If legal educators treat commitment to learning as an important
professional value, they would learn more about learning. Law professors can do so by
talking with colleagues about what does or does not work in the classroom. They can
also engage their students in such conversations, and commit themselves to listening and
learning from dialogue of this sort.” Wegner, supra note 13, at 203.
109. See Lin, Schwartz & Hatano, supra note 60, at 246 (arguing that teaching—a “deeply social
act involving peers, students, and parents”—can benefit from a type of metacognition that
“involves both the adaptation of oneself and one’s environment in response to a wide range
of classroom variability” because each class is different, exhibits unique “challenges and
charms,” a “number of hidden features,” and a “cross-cultural” aspect given that “teachers
and students rarely share the exactly same values and experiences.”).
110. See Hartman, supra note 2, at 150. See also id. at 155-61 (offering a range of strategies for teachers
to practice metacognition about their teaching, including teaching strategy projects,
self-questioning to plan, monitor, and evaluate lessons, and self-reflection on their own
videotaped teaching).
111.

Ambrose et al., supra note 10, at 218 (noting that “when it comes to teaching, most of us are
still learning”).
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metacognitive skills with respect to what they are learning about teaching.
Thus, consciously contemplating what is learned about student learning
might itself be a form of teacher metacognition—in essence, “‘[t]hinking about
other people’s thinking.’”112
Being metacognitive about course work can heighten appreciation for the
significance of critical awareness and self-evaluation to professional growth
and being. As educational specialists have put it in describing the importance
of being “more reflective—that is, metacognitive—about our teaching”:
[W]e need to carefully consider our own strengths and weaknesses in relation
to our teaching, not only so we can play to our strengths but also so we can
challenge ourselves to develop in areas in which we may need work. Moreover,
since the task of teaching constantly changes . . . we must continually reassess
the task, plan an effective approach, monitor our progress, evaluate, and
adjust. . . . [And] refining our teaching practice requires being aware of our
core beliefs about teaching and learning. For instance, what do we believe is
the purpose of our teaching? What do we believe about intelligence, ability,
and learning? All these beliefs will impact our metacognitive cycle.113

Certainly, legal educators have heralded the importance of critical selfreflection about their teaching.114 Whatever the label applied to this process,115
we simply encourage systematic self-assessment to the ends of becoming
more aware of our own learning and thinking processes as teachers and
making the adjustments necessary to optimize teaching and learning on the
basis of what we learn about the learning that is or is not taking place within
112. Penée W. Stewart, Susan S. Cooper & Louise R. Moulding, Metacognitive Development in
Professional Educators, 21 The Researcher 32, 38 (2005), http://www.nrmera.org/PDF/
Researcher/Researcherv21n1Stewart.pdf (discussing study showing that educators’
metacognition increases with age and teaching experience, and noting the need to support
metacognitive awareness in teachers).
113.

Ambrose et al., supra note 10, at 223.

114. See, e.g., Gerald F. Hess, Improving Teaching and Learning in Law School: Faculty Development Research,
Principles, and Programs, 12 Widener L. Rev. 443 (2006); Gerald F. Hess, Learning to Think Like
a Teacher: Reflective Journals for Legal Educators, 38 Gonzaga L. Rev. 129 (2002-2003); Wallace J.
Mlyniec, Where to Begin? Training New Teachers in the Art of Clinical Pedagogy, 18 Clinical L. Rev. 505
(2012); Mitchell M. Simon, M.E. Occhialino & Robert L. Fried, Herding Cats: Improving Law
School Teaching, 49 J. Legal Educ. 256 (1999); Filippa Marullo Anzalone, It All Begins with You:
Improving Law School Learning Through Professional Self-Awareness and Critical Reflection, 24 Hamline L.
Rev. 324 (2001).
115.

Silver, supra note 50, at 1, 6 (noting that the terms reflection and metacognition “have deeply
intertwined histories in discourse on teaching and learning” and that their definitions
“are both varied and contested in the research literature”) (citations omitted). Generally
speaking, “reflection is often defined as a conscious exploration of one’s own experiences
. . . and metacognition as the act of thinking about one’s own thought processes . . . .” Id. at 1
(emphases and citations omitted). Nontechnically, “the two terms are relatively synonymous
and are often used interchangeably by educators,” though technically, “these terms have
developed relatively independently in research and practice.” Id. at 6.
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our classrooms.116 Among other approaches, this could entail intentionally
revisiting old assumptions about student learning,117 assessing the substantive
assessments given to students from teaching and learning (rather than content)
perspectives,118 and being transparent with colleagues and students about what
we learn from particular teaching strategies.119 Ideally, law school colleagues
would create an institutional environment that supports a community of
learning for one another, as well as for students.
Learning-Centered Curricular Redesign. To further actualize a stated commitment
to the principles of learning theory, a law school could undertake creation
(or refinement) of a learner-friendly curriculum. The time is past due for law
schools to consider the advantages of a coordinated and progressive program
of legal education, with each learning stage deliberately building upon the
last, to produce graduates capable of entry-level proficiency in the profession.
The concept of intentional and integrated curricular design is not new.120
116. See Vance & Stuart, supra note 41, at 158-61 (noting that the legal academy has a “collective
responsibility” to change its teaching strategies to meet the learning needs of law students).
117.

For example: Do our students read and concentrate as students did twenty years ago? How
can the different strengths of more introverted students be tapped and modeled for others
to appreciate? What does it mean to have a safe classroom when social hierarchies and
inequities are unavoidably imported into learning spaces despite what a professor intends
or even expressly signals? These are just a few of the questions getting at teaching and
learning assumptions that deserve deeper scrutiny. See How People Learn, supra note 57, at
266 (“For teachers to think about and conduct their teaching differently, they need to learn,
and the principles of learning should guide that effort. It is therefore recommended that . . .
[l]earning opportunities be developed that challenge misconceptions about how people
learn and support the development of a new model that is based on learning research.”).

118. See Niedwiecki, Teaching for Lifelong Learning, supra note 52, at 179 (suggesting that professors
take information gleaned from formative student assessments “to self-reflect and self-assess
their own teaching.”) (footnote omitted). A related option is to create an assessment vehicle
that asks students directly about the teaching of particular subjects soon after the subjects
are covered in class. Questions (themselves encouraging metacognition) might request
students to identify what teaching techniques, examples, exercises, or expressions promoted
or detracted from their learning, or to isolate, if they could, the single most important factor
in their learning of a subject, whether directly related to the teacher or not.
119. Sharing with students that we use metacognitive skills to engage in a conscious learning
process about our teaching could motivate students to examine more closely their own
learning processes and to provide important feedback about their learning to us. Also,
talking about teaching trials and errors may have the incidental benefit of helping to
mitigate the paralyzing fear that many law students have about being wrong. Emphasizing
that deep learning requires experimenting with alternative lines of thought until the best
emerges could be quite comforting to the legal novice, encouraging the student to be more
creative about and comfortable with unfamiliar ways of thinking or the struggle necessary
for deep learning. Of course, the classroom power differential may make these conversations
more difficult or less authentic than they would be in its absence. And self-disclosure like
this necessitates a certain comfort level that may not exist for all professors.
120. See generally, e.g., Maranville, supra note 9, at 52-58; Sarah O. Schrup & Susan E. Provenzano,
The Conscious Curriculum: From Novice Towards Mastery in Written Legal Analysis and Advocacy, 108 Nw.
U. L. Rev. Colloquy 80 (2013); Nancy B. Rapoport, Rethinking U.S. Legal Education: No More
“Same Old, Same Old”, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 1409 (2013); Kristine Strachan, Curricular Reform in the

740

Journal of Legal Education

But neither is it old or entrenched. Perhaps most important of all, it must be
evolving. Just as teaching is a process in constant motion, so is rethinking
the curriculum. And applying metacognitive practice to curricular redesign
efforts means educating ourselves, as best we can, about the collective learning
processes fostered by the curriculum, and re-examining those processes to
make adjustments necessary to maximize student learning in accordance with
the law school’s curricular mission, while honoring basic teacher autonomy
and a faculty member’s pedagogic strengths within individual classrooms or
courses.121
As Professor Kris Franklin argues in this symposium, the candid
examination of how we teach and why we teach the way we teach in our own
subjects—such as civil procedure—provides a springboard for discussing these
and other issues related to the broader educational mission.122 It is precisely
these types of conversations we hope to encourage with this symposium—
conversations with an eye toward promoting the collective educational
experience, with the ultimate end of serving student learning in and of itself,
both as the foundation for acquiring professional competence and spurring
personal growth for both student and teacher.123 As Parker Palmer urged:
Involvement in a community of pedagogical discourse is more than a voluntary
option for individuals who seek support and opportunities for growth. It is
a professional obligation that educational institutions should expect of those
who teach—for the privatization of teaching not only keeps individuals from
growing in their craft but fosters institutional incompetence as well.124

The more deeply we each understand what, where, when, how, and why
we teach in the ways that we do, the more informed our collective discussions
Second and Third Years: Structure, Progression, and Integration, 39 J. Legal Educ. 523 (1989).
121. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Standard 315: Evaluation of Program of Legal Education, Learning Outcomes, and
Assessment Methods, in ABA Standards, supra note 8, at 23 (requiring that every law school
“conduct ongoing evaluation of the law school’s program of legal education, learning
outcomes, and assessment methods . . . and . . . use the results of this evaluation to determine
the degree of student attainment of competency in the learning outcomes and to make
appropriate changes to improve the curriculum.”).
122. Franklin, supra note 7, at 839-41.
123. Not to be overlooked are the important contributions that academic support professionals
can make to these conversations. See generally Louis N. Schulze Jr., Alternative Justifications for
Academic Support II: How “Academic Support Across the Curriculum” Helps Meet the Goals of the Carnegie
Report and Best Practices, 40 Cap. U. L. Rev. 1 (2012) (calling for expansion of academic support
programs to reach all law students, with the goals of orienting them to learning objectives
and expectations and assisting them to become self-regulated and lifelong learners).
124. Parker J. Palmer, The Courage to Teach: Exploring the Inner Landscape of a
Teacher’s Life 144 (1998). And as Wegner analogously urged, in advocating the creation of
communities for “civic dialogue,” “[l]awyers can work together in the interest of learning,
coming together in candid discourse about things that matter, with open minds, and mutual
respect for each other.” Wegner, supra note 13, at 198.
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about the curriculum will be. Thus, in metacognitive mode, it would
be important to discern what subjects, skills, or values are being taught
throughout the curriculum and where.125 In addition, consideration should be
given to the methods being used to teach them, why such methods are being
used, and whether there are any lessons to be learned about sequencing of
pedagogic strategies, especially given the importance of providing students
with opportunities both to practice what they learn and to self-evaluate their
performance.126
For example, based on what they are learning about their students’ learning,
faculty might together consider questions like those proposed below as part of
an effort to create or refine a learner-friendly curriculum that reconsiders the
basic assumptions of the traditional law school model and demonstrates a new
respect for the efficacy of the learning process in professional life:
• How, if at all, should learning about learning be taught in the law school, and
when?
• How can we effectively teach students to recognize and reconcile the cognitive,
metacognitive, and affective dimensions of learning?
• How can the first semester of law school be redesigned to provide better context
or scaffolding for the learning to come in subsequent semesters?
• Are there particular subjects or skills that are most challenging to learn and, if
so, why?
• Within a subject, are there different ways of organizing what we teach for better
understanding?
• Should certain courses be taught before others to better position students to
learn the subjects or skills taught within them?
• Which teaching methods are most appropriate for which learning outcomes and
why?
• How might we adapt teaching materials to incorporate learning about learning
or to better facilitate the metacognitive process?
• What can we do to negotiate the impact of our technology-rich world and its
effect on the law school’s learning environments?
• How can we use the teaching of learning about learning to further students’
development of professional judgment?
• How might learning about learning affect ethical development and the integration
125. These are curriculum mapping decisions. “A curriculum map is a wide-angle view of
a program of instruction. For each outcome, a curriculum map identifies where in the
curriculum students will be introduced to the skill, value, or knowledge; where in the
curriculum the students will practice it; and at what point in the curriculum students can
be expected to have attained the desired level of proficiency.” Stuckey et al., supra note 39,
at 93. See also Judith Welch Wegner, Curricular Mapping as a Tool for Improvement, in Building on
Best Practices, supra note 9, at 37-42 (describing the benefits and processes for curricular
mapping). See also id. at 42 (noting that curriculum mapping “involves the process of making
actual teaching and learning visible, rather than relying on assertions of goals and plans.”).
126. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, Standard 303: Curriculum, in ABA Standards, supra note 8, at 16
(requiring at least six credit hours of experiential courses that “provide multiple opportunities
for performance” and “provide opportunities for self-evaluation.”).
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of personal with professional values?
• What insights can practicing lawyers provide about the nature of learning about
learning in practice?
• What resources (human or otherwise) does the institution have, or what resources
need to be added, to assist with these questions?
• What alliances or understandings should be forged, if any, with undergraduate
or graduate institutions to better prepare students to learn how to learn?
• What could law schools be doing to study the educational impact of teaching
students how to learn?

Discussing these types of pedagogic choices and the consequential impact
on student learning seems essential for a curricular design that strives to be
intentional, progressive, and responsive to the demands of professional life.
Being collectively self-reflective as a faculty about larger curricular questions
is vital to getting at what is actually is happening in the broader learning
processes across the three years of law school and to discerning what can
be done to better align the overall learning experience with the institution’s
learning outcomes.127 This, perhaps, is the ultimate metacognitive task—
becoming aware, to the extent feasible, of the cumulative learning across the
entire law school journey and monitoring the efficacy of the teaching practices
used, as a whole, for producing the types of graduates envisioned by a school’s
curricular mission.
Conclusion
Intentionality—at both individual and institutional levels—takes center stage
in this symposium. Each article, in its own way, asks us to consciously confront
what exactly it is we are trying to do in educating our students. These types
of inquiries, whether subject-specific or curriculumwide, naturally implicate
thinking and talking about ourselves, not just as teachers, but as learners. If,
as Parker Palmer observes, “[t]eaching, like any truly human activity, emerges
from one’s inwardness, for better or worse,”128 then venturing within, through
self-awareness and monitoring of our work, seems not only wise but necessary
to truly understand the pedagogic choices we make and their consequences for
our students, our curriculums, and, ultimately, our professional communities.
As legal professionals—whether students, professors, or practitioners—it
behooves us to leave our metacognitive monitors in the “on” position more
often to capitalize on what we learn from thinking about thinking, whether
the subject of thought is the student, the day’s class, the curriculum, the client,
or ourselves. It is important to be explicit that knowing how to learn, and to
learn deeply, is imperative for both studying and practicing law. At the heart
127. Another benefit of collective conversation is the intellectual vitality and faculty scholarship
that can result from thinking deeply about intersections between one’s subject area and
learning theory. Indeed, teachers thinking and writing on these dual planes actually face
complex questions of “substance and procedure” that go to the heart of each—not unlike the
basic dilemma of civil procedure itself.
128. Palmer, supra note 12, at 1.
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of this imperative is the humility in consistently testing our assumptions about
learning and demonstrating the intellectual and emotional discipline required
for assessing the quality of the learning necessary to do our jobs as educators
or practicing lawyers in a complex and rapidly changing world.
What we have discussed in these pages, frankly, has an exhausting quality
about it. There are so many aspects of the law school curriculum that require
deliberate, dedicated, and reiterated effort and attention. There may not be
enough time to do it all, particularly in this exciting yet uncertain time of
transition for the legal academy, required, as it has been, to take a deep look
at itself, institution by institution, and, ultimately, individual by individual, to
ascertain how, what, and, ultimately, why we teach. Clearly there are choices to
be made and compromises to attend them in landscapes of limited resources,
both human and financial. But despite these obstacles, it is our primary
obligation to prepare our students to enter a learned profession, one that plays
a fundamental role in safekeeping a justice ideal that, at its core, honors all.
And that, perhaps, is the ultimate purpose of this symposium.

